Special report OnePress
Ethiopian energy projects are no longer an internal affair limited to the borders of the country, the waters that descend from the Ethiopian plateau cross into Sudan, and any change in its management is reflected in the lives of the population, agriculture and the operation of dams and water stations in the downstream countries. Today, as Addis Ababa heads towards a new nuclear power project, a question is emerging that goes beyond the amount of electricity the plant will produce: how will the potential risks of a new strategic project be managed in a country that shares its natural resources with its neighbors?
On 21 October 2026, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed announced progress in his country's nuclear energy program, emphasizing the importance of nuclear technology in development, industry and other sectors. The announcement comes at a time when the repercussions of the operation of the Renaissance Dam on the management of the waters of the Blue Nile are still a matter of technical and political debate, while Sudan has witnessed widespread floods in recent years, and the rise in water levels in 2025 has sparked a new dispute over the way the dam operates and discharges water.
The file here is not a pre-accusation of Ethiopia, nor an assumption that the nuclear plant will cause disaster, but an attempt to examine what these projects mean for neighboring countries, and what data, guarantees and early warning mechanisms should be available so that technical decisions within one country do not turn into cross-border crises.
A new nuclear project. What did Ethiopia say?
According to the Ethiopian News Agency, Abiy Ahmed visited the Ethiopian Nuclear Energy Commission on October 21, 2026, to review progress in developing the nuclear program. He stressed that nuclear energy and technology could support industrialization and digital infrastructure, along with applications in health, agriculture, industry and environmental protection, while stressing that the development of the program must be done in a safe, responsible and sustainable manner.
The information contained in the current statements includes a plan to build a station with a total capacity of 2,400 megawatts, through two units with a capacity of 1,200 megawatts each, with an estimated duration of ten years, and reducing the candidate sites from 30 to three.
However, the announcement of a nuclear program does not mean that the station has entered the construction phase or that its final location has been decided. It was also not possible to independently verify the details of the units, the production capacity and the timetable in question from the official statement available about Abiy Ahmed’s visit.
This is where the questions of concern to the neighboring countries begin: Where will the station be built? What is the source of cooling water? What are the potential environmental risks? Will sufficient information on environmental impact assessments and contingency plans be made available to the Sudan and neighbouring States?
The Renaissance Dam. When technical decisions cross boundaries
The Renaissance Dam provides a practical example of the importance of managing major projects located on the upper reaches of shared rivers. Ethiopia's dam on the Blue Nile is not just a power generation project, but an installation that affects the way its reservoir is filled and operated at the time and quantity of water flowing into the Sudan.
A scientific study published in 2023 in the journal Hydrology and Earth System Sciences indicates that filling the dam reservoir during specific months resulted in reduced water flows to Sudan in some periods, and that subsequent drainage changes affected the management of Sudanese dams and irrigation needs. The study also shows that heavy rainfall has been an important factor in rising flows during flood seasons.
These findings reveal that the issue is not only about the dam’s existence or absence, but also the timing of storage and discharge, the extent of the exchange of hydrological data, and the ability of downstream countries to prepare for sudden changes.
In July 2020, the start of filling the GERD reservoir coincided with an exceptional rainy season in the region, while Sudan recorded record levels of flooding that year. But this synchronization does not prove that the GERD alone caused the flooding of Sudan; UN and FAO reports have linked the disaster to heavy rains and flooding of the Nile and its tributaries, and hydrological studies distinguish between the impact of filling on water flows and the impact of rain on flood volume.
This distinction is essential in any professional investigation: a documented flood disaster may not be turned into evidence of the liability of a particular enterprise without technical evidence of causation.
The floods of 2020. Figures reveal the magnitude of the losses
On 20 September 2020, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) announced that floods had affected some 730,000 people in Sudan’s 18 states, including 438,000 children, and that more than 146,000 homes had been destroyed or damaged. Water also destroyed 179 public facilities, including schools and health centres, and more than 5,500 head of livestock were killed.
A rapid assessment of the impact of the 2020 floods, prepared by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) in cooperation with the Sudanese government, showed that about 2.2 million hectares of land planted with rain-fed crops were flooded, with production losses estimated at more than 1 million tons. About 103,000 hectares of irrigated agricultural land have been damaged, and about 598,000 families of farmers and herders have been affected.
These figures show that the impact of the floods did not stop at flooded houses; It extended to food security, livelihoods and the ability to restore agricultural activity. However, these losses are related to the 2020 flood disaster, and not all of them are attributable to the GERD.
September and October 2025. Accusations of water drainage
The GERD file returned to the fore in the fall of 2025, following rising levels of the Nile and flooding in Sudan and Egypt, following the official opening of the dam on September 9 of that year.
In a report published by Reuters on October 6, 2025, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) reported that about 1,200 families in Bahri, Khartoum state, had been displaced by the floods. Egypt’s Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation accused Ethiopia of conducting sudden and uncoordinated water discharges, which it said contributed to the flooding.
According to the same report, the Egyptian ministry said that the discharge amounted to about 485 million cubic meters on September 10, then rose to about 780 million cubic meters on September 27, 2025, before falling later. These flows have put pressure on the Sudanese Roseres Dam and contributed to the transfer of additional quantities of water to downstream countries.
But Ethiopia has rejected the accusations, with Ethiopia's water and energy ministry saying the orderly discharge of the dam had helped to reduce the impact of flooding and that heavy rains could have caused more damage if it had not been for the dam.
The reports thus prove that there were floods, displacements of Sudanese families and a formal disagreement over the impact of the operation of the dam, rather than the ultimate technical responsibility for the flooding. Determining this issue requires independent daily data on rainfall, flows, storage and drainage, along with a hydrological assessment that determines each factor's contribution to rising water levels.
From water to nuclear power. What is changing for Sudan?
The construction of a nuclear power plant is technically different from the construction of a dam on a shared river, and does not automatically mean that its risks will be transferred to Sudan. But the nature of the new project poses another set of questions related to nuclear safety, the environment, water and regional coordination.
First: the location of the plant and water sources. Impact assessment depends on the location of the facility, the nature of the cooling system and the water source used. If the project is close to a common watercourse, the study of the impact of clouds and thermal discharges on the water system should be examined. If it is far from common rivers, the nature of the potential impact varies.
Second: Safety and emergency response. Nuclear installations require natural and operational risk assessment, accident response plans, and continuous environmental monitoring. It is in the interest of the Sudan to know what notification and coordination mechanisms can be activated in the event of an incident with cross-border effects, in accordance with the relevant international frameworks.
Third: Exchange of information. Disagreements over the GERD have shown that a lack of information or a different interpretation of the data could turn into a political crisis between countries. The dissemination of basic technical information on the station's location, environmental impact assessment and contingency plans would thus help to build confidence and avoid conflicting estimates.
Fourth, the potential environmental risks. The existence of a radiological threat to the Sudan cannot be confirmed simply by the announcement of a nuclear project in Ethiopia. The likelihood of radioactive contamination, in the event of an accident, depends on the type of incident, its location, its size, weather and water conditions, and on containment and response procedures. Therefore, any risk assessments should be based on technical studies, not assumptions.
What should Sudan know before operating the plant?
If Ethiopia moves from the planning stage to implementation, the Sudanese interest requires following up a number of technical files, most notably:
* The final location of the plant, and the nature of the water and energy sources used.
* Results of environmental impact assessment and natural and operational risk studies.
* The regulatory body responsible for nuclear safety and the extent of its independence and technical capacity.
* Arrangements for early notification and cooperation with neighbouring States in emergency situations.
* Mechanisms for environmental monitoring and data exchange related to transboundary risks.
These demands are not meant to challenge Ethiopia’s right to develop energy sources, but rather to emphasize that projects with potential extraterritorial impact need transparency and coordination commensurate with their size and nature.
. The lesson left by the Renaissance Dam
The experience of GERD shows that major energy projects are measured not only by the amount of electricity they produce or the investments they attract, but also by how they are managed, the transparency of their data, and the extent to which they respect the rights and interests of countries with which they share natural resources.
In the case of the Ethiopian nuclear project, there is as yet insufficient information to suggest that it would pose a direct threat to the Sudan. However, the absence of evidence of a specific risk does not obviate the need to assess risks in advance and to provide reliable technical information about the project before it moves into the implementation and operational phases.
The question that needs to be addressed in the regional debate is: Will the expansion of Ethiopian energy projects be accompanied by clear mechanisms for coordination and information exchange with neighboring countries, or will these countries continue to receive the effects of technical decisions after they occur?